Leviathan quotes

For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why may we not say, that all “automata” (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life?

For what is the “heart,” but a “spring”; and the “nerves,” but so many “strings”; and the “joints,” but so many “wheels,” giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer?

“Art” goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, “man.” For by art is created that great “Leviathan” called a “Commonwealth,” or “State,” in Latin Civitas, which is but an artificial man;

And this is it, the Latins call “imagination,” from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it “fancy”; which signifies “appearance,” and is as proper to one sense, as to another.

“Imagination,” therefore, is nothing but “decaying sense”; and is found in men, and many other living creatures, as well sleeping, as waking.

The decay of sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner as the light of the sun obscureth the light of the stars;

or in tune, to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may ofttimes perceive the way of it, and the dependence of one thought upon another.

For in a discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more impertinent, than to ask, as one did, what was the value of a Roman penny?

Yet the coherence to me was manifest enough. For the thought of the war, introduced the thought of the delivering up the king to his enemies; the thought of that, brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ;

the “future” being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past, to the actions that are present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience, but not with certainty enough.

And though it be called prudence, when the event answereth our expectation; yet in its own nature, it is but presumption.

For the foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to come. From him only, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy. The best prophet naturally is the best guesser;

yet in its own nature, it is but presumption. For the foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to come. From him only, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy.

The best prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most “signs” to guess by.

A “sign” is the evident antecedent of the consequent; and contrarily, the consequent of the antecedent, when the like consequences have been observed before: and the oftener they have been observed, the less uncertain is the sign.

The invention of “printing,” though ingenious, compared with the invention of “letters,” is no great matter.

But who was the first that found the use of letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men say was Cadmus, the son of Agenor, king of Phoenicia.

or thus, “if he be a man, he is a living creature”; if the latter name, “living creature,” signify all that the former name “man” signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence, is “true”; otherwise “false.”

For “true” and “false” are attributes of speech, not of things.

And where speech is not, there is neither “truth” nor “falsehood”; “error” there may be, as when we expect that which shall not be, or suspect what has not been; but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth.

which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true science are above it.

For between true science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is in the middle.

Natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err; and as men abound in copiousness of language, so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary.

Nor is it possible without letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or, unless his memory be hurt by disease or ill constitution of organs, excellently foolish.

For words are wise men’s counters, they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man.

“Subject to names,” is whatsoever can enter into or be considered in an account, and be added one to another to make a sum, or subtracted one from another and leave a remainder. The Latins called accounts of money rationes, and accounting ratiocinatio;

But this privilege is allayed by another; and that is, by the privilege of absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man only. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that profess philosophy.

For it is most true that Cicero saith of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of philosophers.

And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the definitions, or explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry;

wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles.

For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him?

By this it appears that reason is not, as sense and memory, born with us; nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is; but attained by industry; first in apt imposing of names;

And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men.

And therefore much laughter at the defects of others, is a sign of pusillanimity.

For of great minds, one of the proper works is, to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves only with the most able.

who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much laughter at the defects of others, is a sign of pusillanimity.

For of great minds, one of the proper works is, to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves only with the most able.

On the contrary, “sudden dejection,” is the passion that causeth “weeping”; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power:

Therefore some weep for the loss of friends; others for their unkindness; others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by reconciliation. But in all cases, both laughter, and weeping, are sudden motions; custom taking them both away.

For no man laughs at old jests; or weeps for an old calamity.

“Grief,” for the discovery of some defect of ability, is “shame,” or the passion that discovereth itself in “blushing”: and consisteth in the apprehension of something dishonourable; and in young men is a sign of the love of good reputation, and commendable:

“Continual success” in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call “felicity”; I mean the felicity of this life.

For there is no such thing as perpetual tranquility of mind, while we live here; because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without fear, no more than without sense.

What kind of felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour Him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joys, that now are as incomprehensible as the word of schoolmen “beatifical vision” is unintelligible.

Virtue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence, and consisteth in comparison.

For if all things were equal in all men, nothing would be prized.

And by “virtues intellectual,” are always understood such abilities of the mind as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a “good wit”;

and the difference is only in the want of discretion. So that where wit is wanting, it is not fancy that is wanting, but discretion.

Judgment therefore without fancy is wit, but fancy without judgment, not.

When the thoughts of a man, that has a design in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that design; or what design they may conduce unto;

To govern well a family and a kingdom, are not different degrees of prudence; but different sorts of business; no more than to draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater than the life, are different degrees of art.

A plain husbandman is more prudent in affairs of his own house, than a privy-councillor in the affairs of another man.

To prudence, if you add the use of unjust or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by fear, or want; you have that crooked wisdom which is called “craft”; which is a sign of pusillanimity.

And if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madness, yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough.

If some man in Bedlam should entertain you with sober discourse; and you desire in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time requite his civility; and he should tell you, he were God the Father; I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his madness.

This opinion of inspiration, called commonly, private spirit, begins very often, from some lucky finding of an error generally held by others;

yet, when many of them conspire together, the rage of the whole multitude, is visible enough.

For what argument of madness can there be greater, than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends?

Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their lifetime before they have been protected, and secured from injury.

They are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of Suarez’ first book, Of the Concourse, Motion, and Help of God.

When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or intend to make others so?

And particularly, in the question of transubstantiation; where after certain words spoken;

by others from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the schoolmen; or in questions of abstruse philosophy.

The common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are therefore by those other egregious persons counted idiots.

But to be assured their words are without anything correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some examples;

such as is the power of a commonwealth: or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the power of a faction or of divers factions leagued.

Therefore to have servants, is power; to have friends, is power: for they are strengths united.

Also riches joined with liberality, is power; because it procureth friends, and servants; without liberality, not so; because in this case they defend not; but expose men to envy, as a prey.

Also riches joined with liberality, is power; because it procureth friends, and servants; without liberality, not so; because in this case they defend not; but expose men to envy, as a prey.

Reputation of power, is power; because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need protection.

So is reputation of love of a man’s country, called popularity, for the same reason.

Nobility is power, not in all places, but only in those commonwealths where it has privileges: for in such privileges, consisteth their power.

Eloquence is power, because it is seeming prudence.

Form is power; because being a promise of good, it recommendeth men to the favour of women and strangers.

An able conductor of soldiers, is of great price in time of war present, or imminent; but in peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt judge, is much worth in time of peace; but not so much in war.

And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the price.

For let a man, as most men do, rate themselves at the highest value they can; yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others.

Gravity, as far forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on something else, is honourable; because employment is a sign of power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is dishonourable.

For the gravity of the former, is like the steadiness of a ship laden with merchandize; but of the latter, like the steadiness of a ship ballasted with sand, and other trash.

To be conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for wealth, office, great actions, or any eminent good, is honourable; as a sign of the power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, obscurity is dishonourable.

Nor can a man any more live, whose desires are at an end, than he whose senses and imaginations are at a stand.

Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another, the attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter.

The cause whereof is that the object of man’s desire is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the way of his future desire.

and differ only in the way which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge or opinion each one has of the causes which produce the effect desired.

So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.

And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already attained to, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power;

but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him there, where he might never see him more.

For benefits oblige, and obligation is thraldom; and unrequitable obligation perpetual thraldom; which is to one’s equal, hateful.

But to have received benefits from one, whom we acknowledge for superior, inclines to love; because the obligation is no new depression: and cheerful acceptation, which men call “gratitude,” is such an honour done to the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution.

from whence proceedeth an emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most noble and profitable contention possible; wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.

To have done more hurt to a man, than he can or is willing to expiate, inclineth the doer to hate the sufferer.

For he must expect revenge, or forgiveness; both which are hateful.

sometimes, in mere lottery, as cross and pile, counting holes in a sieve; dipping of verses in Homer, and Virgil; and innumerable other such vain conceits.

So easy are men to be drawn to believe anything, from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with gentleness and dexterity take hold of their fear and ignorance.

And therefore the first founders and legislators of commonwealths among the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience and peace, have in all places taken care;

nor do we read that any religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jews; who, being the peculiar kingdom of God, thought it unlawful to acknowledge subjection to any mortal king or state whatsoever.

And thus you see how the religion of the Gentiles was part of their policy.

But where God Himself, by supernatural revelation, planted religion; there He also made to Himself a peculiar kingdom; and gave laws not only of behaviour towards Himself, but also towards one another;

from whom they had been so lately delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and that generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel (Judges 2:11) were dead; another generation arose, and served Baal.

So that miracles failing, faith also failed.

Again, when the sons of Samuel (1 Sam.

with other signs of private interest, enough to mortify the most lively faith, if, as I said, the civil magistrate and custom did not more sustain it, than any opinion they have of the sanctity, wisdom, or probity of their teachers?

So that I may attribute all the changes of religion in the world to one and the same cause; and that is, unpleasing priests; and those not only amongst Catholics, but even in that Church that hath presumed most of reformation.

yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their own wit at hand, and other men’s at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal.

For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of anything, than that every man is contented with his share.

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies;

and from others, by the example.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.

The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them;

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.

The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation.

The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them;

but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of “time” is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather.

For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.

All other time is “peace.”

what opinion he has of his fellow-subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow-citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children and servants, when he locks his chests.

Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my words?

But neither of us accuse man’s nature in it. The desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them;

To this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place.

Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues.

Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions.

Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions.

They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude.

It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no “mine” and “thine” distinct; but only that to be every man’s, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it.

and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason.

The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them.

And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are they which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature: whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two following chapters.

nor does an unrighteous man lose his character for such actions as he does, or forbears to do, for fear, because his will is not framed by the justice, but by the apparent benefit of what he is to do.

That which gives to human actions the relish of justice is a certain nobleness or gallantness of courage, rarely found, by which a man scorns to be beholden, for the contentment of his life, to fraud or breach of promise.

This justice of the manners is that which is meant, where justice is called a virtue, and injustice a vice.

we may in the eighth place, for a law of Nature, set down this precept, “that no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare hatred or contempt of another.” The breach of which law is commonly called “contumely.”

The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of mere nature; where, as has been shown before, all men are equal.

The inequality that now is, has been introduced by the laws civil.

others to serve, meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not philosophers as he; as if master and servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of wit; which is not only against reason, but also against experience.

For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather govern themselves than be governed by others

: nor when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force with them who distrust their own wisdom, do they always, or often, or almost at any time, get the victory. If Nature therefore have made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledged:

and divers men, differ not only in their judgment, on the senses of what is pleasant and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable or disagreeable to reason, in the actions of common life.

Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himself; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth evil

: from whence arise disputes, controversies, and at last war. And therefore so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war, as private appetite is the measure of good and evil:

… “equity,” “modesty,” “mercy,” and, in sum, “doing to others, as we would be done to,” of themselves, without the terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like.

And covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.

Therefore notwithstanding the laws of Nature, which everyone hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely, if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security;

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the common good differeth not from the private; and being by nature inclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit.

But man, whose joy consisteth in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not, as man, the use of reason, do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their common business;

It is true that in a commonwealth, where, by the negligence or unskilfulness of governors and teachers, false doctrines are by time generally received; the contrary truths may be generally offensive.

Yet the most sudden and rough bursting in of a new truth that can be, does never break the peace, but only sometimes awake the war.

For those men that are so remissly governed, that they dare take up arms to defend or introduce an opinion, are still in war; and their condition not peace, but only a cessation of arms for fear of one another;

The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince are his creatures. As in the presence of the master, the servants are equal, and without any honour at all; so are the subjects in the presence of the sovereign.

And though they shine some more, some less, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the stars in the presence of the sun.

But a man may here object, that the condition of subjects is very miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions of him or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands.

… themselves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it necessary for their governors to draw from them what they can in time of peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their enemies.

For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, that is their passions and self-love, through which every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, namely, moral and civil science, to see afar off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoided.

which for the most part are of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of wealth than of knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which may and do commonly excite men to action, but not govern them in it.

For the “understanding” is by the flame of the passions, never enlightened, but dazzled.

Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an assembly can receive counsel with secrecy, because of their own multitude.

Besides there is no favourite of a monarch, which cannot as well succour his friends as hurt his enemies; but orators, that is to say, favourites of sovereign assemblies, though they have great power to hurt, have little to save.

For to accuse, requires less eloquence, such is man’s nature, than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution more resembles justice.

Sixthly, that it is an inconvenience in monarchy, that the sovereignty may descend upon an infant, or one that cannot discern between good and evil:

The condition of man in this life shall never be without inconveniences; but there happeneth in no commonwealth any great inconvenience but what proceeds from the subject’s disobedience, and breach of those covenants, from which the commonwealth has its being.

And whosoever thinking sovereign power too great, will seek to make it less, must subject himself to the power that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.

The greatest objection is, that of the practice; when men ask where and when such power has by subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask them again, when or where has there been a kingdom long free from sedition and civil war.

But howsoever, an argument from the practice of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the causes and nature of commonwealths, and suffer daily those miseries that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is invalid.

For though in all places of the world men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred that so it ought to be.

The skill of making and maintaining commonwealths, consisteth in certain rules, as doth arithmetic and geometry; not, as tennis-play, on practice only:

And this shall suffice, as to the matter in hand, of that natural “liberty,” which only is properly called “liberty.”

But as men, for the attaining of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an artificial man, which we call a commonwealth; so also have they made artificial chains, called “civil laws,” which they themselves, by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end, to the lips of that man, or assembly, to whom they have given the sovereign power; and at the other end to their own ears.

These bonds, in their own nature but weak, may nevertheless be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.

and at the other end to their own ears.

These bonds, in their own nature but weak, may nevertheless be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.

In relation to these bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the “liberty” of “subjects.”

For the right men have by nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished.

The sovereignty is the soul of the commonwealth, which once departed from the body, the members do no more receive their motion from it.

The end of obedience is protection, which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own or in another’s sword, nature applieth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintain it.

in him it is no injustice; because in this case he is no part of the assembly. And though he hire such friends with money, unless there be an express law against it, yet it is not injustice.

For sometimes, as men’s manners are, justice cannot be had without money; and every man may think his own cause just, till it be heard and judged.

In all commonwealths, if private men entertain more servants than the government of his estate, and lawful employment he has for them requires, it is faction, and unlawful. For having the protection of the commonwealth, he needeth not the defence of private force.

Secondly, in an assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the public; and these their interests make passionate, and passion eloquent, and eloquence draws others into the same advice.

For the passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in an assembly are like many brands, that inflame one another, especially when they blow one another with orations, to the setting of the commonwealth on fire, under pretence of counselling it.

Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine, when there is need, the truth or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advice he gives, by frequent interruptions and objections;

For having power to make and repeal laws, he may when he pleaseth free himself from that subjection, by repealing those laws that trouble him and making of new; and consequently he was free before.

For he is free, that can be free when he will: nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himself; because he that can bind, can release; and therefore he that is bound to himself only, is not bound.

3. When long use obtaineth the authority of a law, it is not the length of time that maketh the authority, but the will of the sovereign signified by his silence, for silence is sometimes an argument of consent;

But the right of nature, that is, the natural liberty of man, may by the civil law be abridged and restrained: nay, the end of making laws is no other but such restraint; without the which there cannot possibly be any peace.

And law was brought into the world for nothing else but to limit the natural liberty of particular men, in such manner as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and join together against a common enemy.

5. If the sovereign of one commonwealth subdue a people that have lived under other written laws, and afterwards govern them by the same laws by which they were governed before;

I say therefore that there is no place in the world, where this can be an interpretation of a law of Nature, or be made a law by the sentences of precedent judges, that had done the same.

For he that judged it first, judged unjustly; and no injustice can be a pattern of judgment to succeeding judges.

A written law may forbid innocent men to fly, and they may be punished for flying:

But because there is no judge subordinate, nor sovereign, but may err in a judgment of equity; if afterward in another like case he find it more consonant to equity to give a contrary sentence, he is obliged to do it.

No man’s error becomes his own law; nor obliges him to persist in it.

Neither, for the same reason, becomes it a law to other judges, though sworn to follow it.

yet in laws immutable, such as are the laws of Nature, they are no laws to the same or other judges, in the like cases forever after.

Princes succeed one another; and one judge passeth, another cometh; nay, heaven and earth shall pass; but not one tittle of the law of Nature shall pass; for it is the eternal law of God.

Therefore all the sentences of precedent judges that have ever been, cannot altogether make a law contrary to natural equity:

In like manner, when question is of the meaning of written laws, he is not the interpreter of them, that writeth a commentary upon them.

For commentaries are commonly more subject to cavil than the text; and therefore need other commentaries; and so there will be no end of such interpretation.

And therefore unless there be an interpreter authorized by the sovereign, from which the subordinate judges are not to recede, the interpreter can be no other than the ordinary judges, in the same manner as they are in cases of the unwritten law;

yet they are not assured evidences of special revelation.

Miracles are marvellous works; but that which is marvellous to one, may not be so to another.

Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible felicities of this world are most often the work of God by natural and ordinary causes.

nor is the pleasure a man may have in imagining or dreaming of the death of him, from whose life he expecteth nothing but damage and displeasure, a sin; but the resolving to put some act in execution that tendeth thereto.

For to be pleased in the fiction of that which would please a man if it were real, is a passion so adherent to the nature both of man and every other living creature, as to make it a sin, were to make sin of being a man.

The consideration of this has made me think them too severe, both to themselves and others, that maintain that the first motions of the mind, though checked with the fear of God, be sins.

for the safety whereof all sovereignty was ordained. But this is to be understood only of those that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the power that protected them; for that was a crime from the beginning.

The source of every crime is some defect of the understanding, or some error in reasoning, or some sudden force of the passions.

Defect in the understanding is “ignorance”; in reasoning, “erroneous opinion.” Again, ignorance is of three sorts; of the “law,” and of the “sovereign,” and of the “penalty.”

so that the benefit of their crimes redoundeth to posterity, and such as would least have wished it: which argues they were not so wise as they thought they were.

And those that deceive upon hope of not being observed, do commonly deceive themselves, the darkness in which they believe they lie hidden being nothing else but their own blindness; and are no wiser than children, that think all hid by hiding their own eyes.

And generally all vainglorious men, unless they be withal timorous, are subject to anger; as being more prone than others to interpret for contempt the ordinary liberty of conversation: and there are few crimes that may not be produced by anger.

and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects proceed. And for lust, what it wants in the lasting, it hath in the vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easy or uncertain punishments.

Of all passions, that which inclineth men least to break the laws, is fear.

Nay, excepting some generous natures, it is the only thing, when there is apparence of profit or pleasure by breaking the laws, that makes men keep them. And yet in many cases a crime may be committed through fear.

which I say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges or any other kind of disobedience, but a care in governors not to countenance anything obliquely which directly they forbid.

The examples of princes, to those that see them, are, and ever have been, more potent to govern their actions than the laws themselves.

And though it be our duty to do, not what they do, but what they say, yet will that duty never be performed till it please God to give men an extraordinary and supernatural grace to follow that precept.

For by that which has been said before, no man is supposed bound by covenant, not to resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person.

In the making of a commonwealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another, but not of defending himself.

Also he obligeth himself to assist him that hath the sovereignty in the punishing of another; but of himself not.

because the nature of this offence consisteth in the renouncing of subjection, which is a relapse into the condition of war, commonly called rebellion, and they that so offend, suffer not as subjects, but as enemies.

For “rebellion” is but war renewed.

“Reward” is either of “gift” or by “contract.” When by contract, it is called “salary” and “wages”; which is benefit due for service performed or promised.

and another that depends on that, which is contention about jurisdiction, each court drawing to itself as many causes as it can. But in offices of execution there are not those inconveniences; because their employment cannot be increased by any endeavour of their own.

And thus much shall suffice for the nature of punishment and reward; which are, as it were, the nerves and tendons that move the limbs and joints of a commonwealth.

Hitherto I have set forth the nature of man, whose pride and other passions have compelled him to submit himself to government:

Though nothing can be immortal which mortals make, yet if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their commonwealths might be secured, at least from perishing by internal diseases.

For by the nature of their institution, they are designed to live as long as mankind, or as the laws of Nature or as justice itself, which gives them life.

And I doubt not but many men have been contented to see the late troubles in England out of an imitation of the Low Countries; supposing there needed no more to grow rich than to change, as they had done, the form of their government.

For the constitution of man’s nature is of itself subject to desire novelty.

When therefore they are provoked to the same by the neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is almost impossible for them not to be content with those that solicit them to change;

To what disease in the natural body of man I may exactly compare this irregularity of a commonwealth, I know not.

But I have seen a man, that had another man growing out of his side, with a head, arms, breast and stomach of his own; if he had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact.

Hitherto I have named such diseases of a commonwealth as are of the greatest and most present danger. There be other not so great, which nevertheless are not unfit to be observed.

Wherein they argue as ill, as if the savage people of America should deny there were any grounds, or principles of reason, so to build a house as to last as long as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well built.

Time and industry produce every day new knowledge.

And as the art of well building is derived from principles of reason, observed by industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and the divers effects of figure and proportion, long after mankind began, though poorly, to build;

For in such a contradiction of opinions, it is most certain that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and it is no wonder if they yet retain a relish of that subtle liquor, wherewith they were first seasoned, against the civil authority.

But to the latter question it is not fit nor needful for me to say either aye or no: for any man that sees what I am doing, may easily perceive what I think.

The safety of the people requireth further, from him or them that have the sovereign power, that justice be equally administered to all degrees of people;

And the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do, are not extenuated, but aggravated by the greatness of their persons; because they have least need to commit them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great, proceed in this manner.

Impunity maketh insolence; insolence, hatred; and hatred, an endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatness, though with the ruin of the commonwealth.

To equal justice appertaineth also the equal imposition of taxes; the equality whereof dependeth not on the equality of riches, but on the equality of the debt that every man oweth to the commonwealth for his defence.

To equal justice appertaineth also the equal imposition of taxes; the equality whereof dependeth not on the equality of riches, but on the equality of the debt that every man oweth to the commonwealth for his defence.

It is not enough for a man to labour for the maintenance of his life; but also to fight, if need be, for the securing of his labour.

They must either do as the Jews did after their return from captivity, in re-edifying the temple, build with one hand, and hold the sword in the other; or else they must hire others to fight for them.

but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not to range a great deal of ground to snatch what they find; but to court each little plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in due season.

And when all the world is overcharged with inhabitants, then the last remedy of all is war; which provideth for every man, by victory or death.

To the care of the sovereign belongeth the making of good laws. But what is a good law? By a good law I mean not a just law, for no law can be unjust.

The law is made by the sovereign power, and all that is done by such power is warranted and owned by every one of the people; and that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust.

It is in the laws of a commonwealth as in the laws of gaming: whatsoever the gamesters all agree on, is injustice to none of them.

A good law is that which is “needful” for the “good of the people,” and withal “perspicuous.”

It is in the laws of a commonwealth as in the laws of gaming: whatsoever the gamesters all agree on, is injustice to none of them. A good law is that which is “needful” for the “good of the people,” and withal “perspicuous.”

For the use of laws, which are but rules authorized, is not to bind the people from all voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashness, or indiscretion; as hedges are set, not to stop travellers, but to keep them in their way.

And therefore a law that is not needful, having not the true end of a law, is not good. A law may be conceived to be good, when it is for the benefit of the sovereign; though it be not necessary for the people;

A law may be conceived to be good, when it is for the benefit of the sovereign; though it be not necessary for the people; but it is not so. For the good of the sovereign and people cannot be separated.

It is a weak sovereign that has weak subjects; and a weak people, whose sovereign wanteth power to rule them at his will.

Unnecessary laws are not good laws; but traps for money: which where the right of sovereign power is acknowledged, are superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, insufficient to defend the people.

and lenity, when there is such place for it, is required by the law of Nature. The punishment of the leaders and teachers in a commotion, not the poor seduced people, when they are punished, can profit the commonwealth by their example.

To be severe to the people, is to punish that ignorance which may in great part be imputed to the sovereign, whose fault it was that they were no better instructed.

In like manner it belongeth to the office and duty of the sovereign, to apply his rewards always so, as there may arise from them benefit to the commonwealth; wherein consisteth their use and end;

(which is ordained not for disservice, but for service past;) nor a sign of gratitude, but of fear; nor does it tend to the benefit, but to the damage of the public.

It is a contention with ambition, like that of Hercules with the monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every one that was vanquished, there grew up three.

For in like manner, when the stubbornness of one popular man is overcome with reward, there arise many more by the example, that do the same mischief in hope of like benefit: and as all sorts of manufacture, so also malice increaseth by being vendible.

nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their armies.

For the greatest and most active part of mankind has never hitherto been well contented with the present.

Concerning the offices of one sovereign to another, which are comprehended in that law, which is commonly called the “law of nations,” I need not say anything in this place, because the law of nations, and the law of Nature, is the same thing.

And again (Psalm 99:1): “God is king, though the nations be angry; and he that sitteth on the cherubims, though the earth be moved.” Whether men will or not, they must be subject always to the divine power.

By denying the existence or providence of God, men may shake off their ease, but not their yoke.

But to call this power of God, which extendeth itself not only to man, but also to beasts and plants and bodies inanimate, by the name of kingdom, is but a metaphorical use of the word.

Private, is in secret free; but in the sight of the multitude, it is never without some restraint, either from the laws, or from the opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature of liberty.

The end of worship amongst men is power.

For where a man seeth another worshipped, he supposeth him powerful, and is the readier to obey him; which makes his power greater. But God has no ends:

for in the attributes which we give to God, we are not to consider the signification of philosophical truth but the signification of pious intention, to do Him the greatest honour we are able.

From the want of which consideration, have proceeded the volumes of disputation about the nature of God, that tend not to His honour, but to the honour of our own wits and learning; and are nothing else but inconsiderate and vain abuses of His sacred name.

Sixthly, in “prayers,” “thanksgivings,” “offerings,” and “sacrifices,” it is a dictate of natural reason that they be everyone in his kind the best, and most significant of honour.

Having thus briefly spoken of the natural kingdom of God and His natural laws, I will add only to this chapter a short declaration of His natural punishments.

There is no action of man in this life that is not the beginning of so long a chain of consequences, as no human providence is high enough to give a man a prospect to the end.

And in this chain, there are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events; in such manner, as he that will do anything for his pleasure, must engage himself to suffer all the pains annexed to it;

in such manner, as he that will do anything for his pleasure, must engage himself to suffer all the pains annexed to it; and these pains are the natural punishments of those actions which are the beginning of more harm than good.

And hereby it comes to pass, that intemperance is naturally punished with diseases; rashness, with mischances; injustice, with the violence of enemies: pride, with ruin; cowardice, with oppression: negligent government of princes, with rebellion; and rebellion, with slaughter.

For seeing punishments are consequent to the breach of laws; natural punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of the laws of Nature; and therefore follow them as their natural, not arbitrary effects.

and not to labour in sifting out a philosophical truth by logic of such mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of natural science.

For it is with the mysteries of our religion as with wholesome pills for the sick, which, swallowed whole, have the virtue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect.

But by the captivity of our understanding, is not meant a submission of the intellectual faculty to the opinion of any other man; but of the will to obedience, where obedience is due.

for in such manner a man doth many times naturally take his dream for a vision as not having well observed his own slumbering.

To say he speaks by supernatural inspiration, is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which he can allege no natural and sufficient reason.

So that though God Almighty can speak to a man by dreams, visions, voice, and inspiration; yet He obliges no man to believe He hath so done to him that pretends it; who, being a man, may err, and, which is more, may lie.

and was no less an angel, than if it had had the form of a man, or child of never so great beauty; or wings, as usually they are painted, for the false instruction of common people.

For it is not the shape; but their use that makes them angels.

But their use is to be significations of God’s presence in supernatural operations; as when Moses (Exod.

but as if God had promised to give them prophetical dreams and visions.

For the proper use of the word “infused,” in speaking of the graces of God, is an abuse of it; for those graces are virtues, not bodies to be carried hither and thither, and to be poured into men as into barrels.

In the same manner, to take “inspiration” in the proper sense, or to say that good “spirits” entered into men to make them prophesy, or evil “spirits” into those that became phrenetic, lunatic, or epileptic, is not to take the word in the sense of …

… of this discourse, there be many kinds, who gain in the opinion of the common sort of men a greater reputation of prophesy, by one casual event that may be but wrested to their purpose, that can be lost again by never so many failings.

Prophesy is not an art, nor, when it is taken for prediction, a constant vocation; but an extraordinary and temporary employment from God, most often of good men, but sometimes also of the wicked.

The woman of Endor, who is said to have had a familiar spirit, and thereby to have raised a phantasm of Samuel, and foretold Saul his death, was not therefore a prophetess, for neither had she any science, whereby she could raise such a phantasm, …

… we see some possible, natural cause of it, how rarely soever the like has been done, or if the like have been often done, how impossible soever it be to imagine a natural means thereof, we no more wonder nor esteem it for a miracle.

Therefore, if a horse or cow should speak, it were a miracle; because both the thing is strange, and the natural cause difficult to imagine.

So also were it to see a strange deviation of Nature, in the production of some new shape of a living creature. But when a man, or other animal, engenders his like, though we know no more how this is done than the other;

if it be not to the edification of God’s people, not the rod, nor the water, nor any other thing is enchanted; that is to say, wrought upon by the words, but the spectator.

So that all the miracle consisteth in this, that the enchanter has deceived a man; which is no miracle, but a very easy matter to do.

For such is the ignorance and aptitude to error generally of all men, but especially of them that have not much knowledge of natural causes, and of the nature and interests of men; as by innumerable and easy tricks to be abused.

But it is too long a business to reckon up the several sorts of those men, which the Greeks called θαυματουργοι, that is to say, workers of things wonderful: and yet these do all they do by their own single dexterity.

But if we look upon the impostures wrought by confederacy, there is nothing how impossible soever to be done that is impossible to be believed.

For two men conspiring, one to seem lame, the other to cure him with a charm, will deceive many; but many conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the rest to bear witness, will deceive many more.

and yet these do all they do by their own single dexterity. But if we look upon the impostures wrought by confederacy, there is nothing how impossible soever to be done that is impossible to be believed.

For two men conspiring, one to seem lame, the other to cure him with a charm, will deceive many; but many conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the rest to bear witness, will deceive many more.

In this aptitude of mankind to give too hasty belief to pretended miracles, there can be no better, nor I think any other caution, than that which God hath prescribed, first by Moses, as I have said before in the precedent chapter, in the beginning …

What opinion of miraculous power, before it was known there was a science of the course of the stars, might a man have gained, that should have told the people this hour or day the sun should be darkened?

A juggler by the handling of his goblets and other trinkets, if it were not now ordinarily practiced, would be thought to do his wonders by the power at least of the devil.

A man that hath practiced to speak by drawing in of his breath (which kind of men in ancient time were called ventriloqui), and so make the weakness of his voice seem to proceed, not from the weak impulsion of the organs of speech, but …

and is called a “civil state,” for that the subjects of it are “men”; and a “Church,” for that the subjects thereof are “Christians.”

“Temporal” and “spiritual” government are but two words brought into the world to make men see double, and mistake their “lawful sovereign.”

It is true that the bodies of the faithful, after the resurrection, shall be not only spiritual but eternal; but in this life they are gross and corruptible. There is therefore no other government in this life, neither of state, nor religion, but temporal;

Likewise (verse 32) that he made other Hebronites “rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites, and the half tribe of Manasseh” (these were the rest of Israel that dwelt beyond Jordan), “for every matter pertaining to God, and affairs of the king.”

Is not this full power, both “temporal” and “spiritual,” as they call it that would divide it?

To conclude; from the first institution of God’s kingdom to the captivity, the supremacy of religion was in the same hand with that of the civil sovereignty; and the priest’s office after the election of Saul, was not magisterial but ministerial.

But what, may some object, if a king, or a senate, or other sovereign person forbid us to believe in Christ?

To this I answer that such forbidding is of no effect; because belief and unbelief never follow men’s commands.

Faith is a gift of God, which man can neither give nor take away by promise of rewards, or menaces of torture. And if it be further asked, what if we be commanded by our lawful prince to say with our tongue, we believe not;

But what, may some object, if a king, or a senate, or other sovereign person forbid us to believe in Christ? To this I answer that such forbidding is of no effect; because belief and unbelief never follow men’s commands.

Faith is a gift of God, which man can neither give nor take away by promise of rewards, or menaces of torture.

And if it be further asked, what if we be commanded by our lawful prince to say with our tongue, we believe not; must we obey such command?

None therefore can be a martyr, neither of the first nor second degree, that have not a warrant to preach Christ come in the flesh; that is to say, none but such as are sent to the conversion of infidels.

For no man is a witness to him that already believeth, and therefore needs no witness; but to them that deny, or doubt, or have not heard it.

Christ sent His apostles and His seventy disciples, with authority to preach; He sent not all that believed. And He sent them to unbelievers; “I send you,” saith He (Matt. 10:16), “as sheep amongst wolves”; not as sheep to other sheep.

Nevertheless, during the apostles’ times, there were other pastors that observed it not; as Diotrephes (3 John 9, etc.), who cast out of the Church such as St. John himself thought fit to be received into it, out of a pride he took in preeminence.

So early it was that vainglory and ambition had found entrance into the Church of Christ.

That a man be liable to excommunication, there be many conditions requisite;

everyone might believe or not believe, according as the allegation seemed to himself to be agreeable or not agreeable to the meaning of the places alleged.

And generally in all cases of the world, he that pretendeth any proof maketh judge of his proof him to whom he addresseth his speech.

And as to the case of the Jews in particular, they were bound by express words (Deut. 17) to receive the determination of all hard questions from the priests and judges of Israel for the time being.

but not to call for fire from heaven to destroy them, nor to compel them to obedience by the sword. In all which there is nothing of power, but of persuasion.

He sent them out as sheep unto wolves, not as kings to their subjects.

They had not in commission to make laws; but to obey, and teach obedience to laws made; and consequently they could not make their writings obligatory canons without the help of the sovereign civil power.

They that served at the altar lived on what was offered. So may the pastors also take what is offered them by their flock; but not exact what is not offered.

In what court should they sue for it, who had no tribunals?

Or, if they had arbitrators amongst themselves, who should execute their judgments when they had no power to arm their officers? It remaineth, therefore, that there could be no certain maintenance assigned to any pastors of the Church but by the whole congregation;

Lastly, he bringeth for argument the testimony of two popes, Innocent and Leo; and I doubt not he might have alleged with as good reason, the testimonies of all the popes almost since St. Peter.

For considering the love of power naturally implanted in mankind, whosoever were made Pope he would be tempted to uphold the same opinion.

Nevertheless, they should therein but do, as Innocent and Leo did, bear witness of themselves, and therefore their witness should not be good.

They ought therefore to ease them, either by holding the reins of government wholly in their own hands; or by wholly delivering them into the hands of the Pope; that such men as are willing to be obedient, may be protected in their obedience.

For this distinction of temporal and spiritual power is but words.

Power is as really divided and as dangerously to all purposes, by sharing with another “indirect” power, as with a “direct” one. But to come now to his arguments.

or by wholly delivering them into the hands of the Pope; that such men as are willing to be obedient, may be protected in their obedience. For this distinction of temporal and spiritual power is but words.

Power is as really divided and as dangerously to all purposes, by sharing with another “indirect” power, as with a “direct” one.

But to come now to his arguments.

or that the one power is to the other, as the means to the end. For we cannot understand that one power hath power over another power; or that one power can have right or command over another.

For subjection, command, right, and power, are accidents, not of powers, but of persons.

One power may be subordinate to another, as the art of a saddler to the art of a rider. If then it be granted, that the civil government be ordained as a means to bring us to a spiritual felicity;

Whosoever therefore unfeignedly desireth to fulfil the commandments of God, or repenteth him truly of his transgressions, or that loveth God with all his heart, and his neighbour as himself, hath all the obedience necessary to his reception into the kingdom of God.

For if God should require perfect innocence, there could no flesh be saved.

But what commandments are those that God hath given us? Are all those laws which were given to the Jews by the hand of Moses the commandments of God? If they be, why are not Christians taught to obey them?

Or how can a man believe that Jesus is the king that shall reign eternally, unless he believe Him also risen again from the dead?

For a dead man cannot exercise the office of a king.

In sum, he that holdeth this foundation, “Jesus is the Christ,” holdeth expressly all that he seeth rightly deduced from it, and implicitly all that is consequent thereunto, though he have not skill enough to discern the consequence.

We are therefore yet in the dark.

The enemy has been here in the night of our natural ignorance, and sown the tares of spiritual errors;

and that, first, by abusing and putting out the light of the Scriptures: for we err, not knowing the Scriptures.

And for the infant that is to be baptized, he is subject to many charms: first, at the church door the priest blows thrice in the child’s face, and says: “Go out of him, unclean spirit, and give place to the Holy Ghost the Comforter.”

As if all children, till blown on by the priest, were demoniacs.

Again, before his entrance into the church, he saith as before, “I conjure thee, etc., to go out, and depart from this servant of God.” And again the same exorcism is repeated once more before he be baptized.

neither for the soul of Lazarus during the four days he was dead; nor for the souls of them which the Roman Church pretend to be tormented now in purgatory.

For God, that could give a life to a piece of clay, hath the same power to give life again to a dead man, and renew his inanimate and rotten carcass into a glorious, spiritual, and immortal body.

Another place is that of 1 Cor. 3, where it is said, that they which build stubble, hay, etc., on the true foundation, their work shall perish; but “they themselves shall be saved, but as through fire”:

yet it is manifest in Scripture to the contrary; where when the golden calf was made, the people said (Exod. 32:4), “These are thy gods, O Israel”; and where the images of Laban (Gen. 31:30) are called his gods.

And we see daily by experience in all sorts of people, that such men as study nothing but their food and ease, are content to believe any absurdity, rather than to trouble themselves to examine it; holding their faith as it were by entail unalienable, except by an express and new law.

But they infer from some other places, that it is lawful to paint angels, and also God himself: as from God’s walking in the garden; from Jacob’s seeing God at the top of the ladder; and from other visions, and dreams.

And the cause of it being the want of leisure from procuring the necessities of life, and defending themselves against their neighbours, it was impossible, till the erecting of great commonwealths, it should be otherwise.

“Leisure” is the mother of “philosophy,” and “Commonwealth” the mother of “peace” and “leisure.”

Where first were great and flourishing cities, there was first the study of “philosophy.” The Gymnosophists of India, the Magi of Persia, and the Priests of Chaldea and Egypt, are counted the most ancient philosophers; and those countries were the most ancient of kingdoms.

Their “logic,” which should be the method of reasoning, is nothing else but captions of words, and inventions how to puzzle such as should go about to pose them.

To conclude, there is nothing so absurd that the old philosophers, as Cicero saith (who was one of them), have not some of them maintained.

And I believe that scarce anything can be more absurdly said in natural philosophy than that which now is called “Aristotle’s Metaphysics”; nor more repugnant to government than much of that he hath said in his Politics;

To conclude, there is nothing so absurd that the old philosophers, as Cicero saith (who was one of them), have not some of them maintained.

And I believe that scarce anything can be more absurdly said in natural philosophy than that which now is called “Aristotle’s Metaphysics”; nor more repugnant to government than much of that he hath said in his Politics; nor more ignorantly than a great part of his Ethics.

The school of the Jews was originally a school of the Law of Moses, who commanded (Deut.

which cannot be avoided by those that will teach philosophy without having first attained great knowledge in geometry. For Nature worketh by motion; the ways and degrees whereof cannot be known, without the knowledge of the proportions and properties of lines and figures.

Their moral philosophy is but a description of their own passions.

For the rule of manners, without civil government, is the law of Nature; and in it the law civil, that determineth what is “honest” and “dishonest,” what is “just” and “unjust,” and generally what is “good” and “evil.”

And for geometry, till of very late times it had no place at all; as being subservient to nothing but rigid truth.

And if any man, by the ingenuity of his own nature, had attained to any degree of perfection therein, he was commonly thought a magician, and his art diabolical.

Now to descend to the particular tenets of vain philosophy, derived to the Universities, and thence into the Church, partly from Aristotle, partly from blindness of understanding; I shall first consider their principles.

and a great many other things that serve to lessen the dependence of subjects on the sovereign power of their country.

For who will endeavour to obey the laws, if he expect obedience to be poured or blown into him?

Or who will not obey a priest that can make God, rather than his sovereign, nay, than God himself? Or who, that is in fear of ghosts, will not bear great respect to those that can make the holy water that drives them from him?

… is his soul, they affirm it to be all of it in his little finger, and all of it in every other part, how small soever, of his body, and yet no more soul in the whole body than in any one of those parts.

Can any man think that God is served with such absurdities?

And yet all this is necessary to believe to those that will believe the existence of an incorporeal soul separated from the body.

But if you ask what they mean by “heaviness,” they will define it to be an endeavour to go to the centre of the earth.

So that the cause why things sink downward, is an endeavour to be below; which is as much as to say, that bodies descend, or ascend, because they do.

Or they will tell you the centre of the earth is the place of rest, and conservation for heavy things; and therefore they endeavour to be there:

Or as if a body were made without any quantity at all, and that afterwards more or less were put into it, according as it is intended the body should be more or less dense.

For the cause of the soul of man, they say, creatur infundendo, and creando infunditur: that is, “it is created by pouring it in,” and “poured in by creation.”

For the cause of sense, an ubiquity of “species”; that is, of the “shows” or “apparitions” of objects; which when they be apparitions to the eye, is “sight”; when to the ear, “hearing”; to the palate, “taste”; to the nostril, “smelling”;

making the “power” the cause of the “act.”

As if one should assign for cause of the good or evil acts of men, their ability to do them.

And in many occasions they put for cause of natural events their own ignorance; but disguised in other words: as when they say, fortune is the cause of things contingent; that is, of things whereof they know no cause: